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Abstract 
There has been a burgeoning number of studies attempting to measure the size of the ‘black’ 
economy.  These are based on a variety of methodologies and provide a range of estimates, 
not just across countries but also within the same countries and often by the same author(s).  
This raises a number of issues:  What is meant by the term ‘black’ economy? Is it an 
appropriate description? What, if any, is the theory underlying the estimates of informal 
economic activity?  This paper examines these and other issues, and concludes that whilst 
the existence of what we prefer to call the ‘informal’ or ‘grey’ economy in most countries is 
incontrovertible, there is a lack of consensus on the appropriate methodology for estimating 
its size.  More importantly, the large number of studies so far are simply exercises in 
measurement without theory, though we are sceptical that even with strong theoretical 
underpinnings it is possible to provide accurate estimates of a complicated web of informal 
activities. 
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1.  Introduction 
In the 1950s two studies, Kaldor (1956) and Cagan (1958), marked the early 
beginnings of research into informal economic activity1.  These were followed in the 
1970s by, among others, Guttman (1977) and Feige (1979).  These early works led to 
a proliferation of research in the 1980s  and 1990s2.  
 
Having read the literature from the 1980s and 1990s as well as more recent research, 
we share the doubts of Tanzi (1999) and Thomas (1999) about the meaning of the 
concept of a ‘black’ economy, and about the methods used to estimate its size.  This 
has led me to wonder what, if anything, we have learnt about informal economic 
activity after five decades of research. 
 
This discussion paper attempts to summarise the burgeoning body of mostly 
empirical literature with a view to drawing firm conclusions about the usefulness of 
what has been done so far and whether researchers should continue to try to 
provide an aggregate estimate of such a disparate group of economic activities. 
 
The ever increasing literature has been driven by legitimate concerns about the 
economic consequences of activities which are unreported and unrecorded.  For 
example, such ‘hidden’ activities "reduce the tax base, thereby undermining the 
financing of public goods and social protection" (Lyssiotou et al, 2004, p.622).  If the 
reduction in the tax base is compensated by an increase in tax rates, this can "create a 
vicious cycle, as this reinforces the incentive not to declare economic activities to the 
public" (ibid).  There is also the issue of the reliability of GDP measures.  If economic 
activities are not reported and recorded, then a country’s measured GDP will be less 
than its actual GDP, with obvious consequences for macroeconomic policies3.  In 
Section 2 we look at the issue of terminology, which remains a cause of confusion.  
Section 3 discusses some of the theoretical issues, while Section 4 presents a 
summary and critique of the expanding list of methodologies.  Section 5 contains 
some general criticisms of the literature, and Section 6 concludes. 
 
 
                                                
1.  The Kaldor study is cited by Bhattacharrya (1999) as "the first attempt to estimate the unrecorded national 
income" (p.349). 
2.  For example, Tanzi (1980, 1983, 1984), Feige (1980, 1989), Contini (1981), Matthews (1982), Frey (1989), Frey & 
Weck-Hanneman (1984), O’Higgins (1989), Pissarides & Weber (1989), Lubell (1991), Loayza (1996),   
Bhattacharrya (1990, 1999), Johnson et al (1997),  Lippert & Walker (1997),   Ernste & Schneider (1998), Giles 
(1999a, 1999b), to name just a few. 
3.  For a discussion of the undesirable economic consequences of informal economic activities, see, for example, 
Smith (1981), Ernste & Schneider (1998), Bhattacharyya (1999) and McGee & Feige (1989).  Kesselman (1997) 
discusses the positive as well as the negative policy implications of tax evasion.   3 
2.  Terminology (or what’s in a name?) 
There is a plethora of terms for what Dixon (1999) describes as "a mixture of non-
market economic activities (such as home production), illegal market activities (such 
as prohibited production and distribution of proscribed substances) and legal 
market activities that are kept hidden for reasons such as tax-evasion" (p.335).   
Including the terms mentioned thus far, the following have been used: black, cash, 
clandestine, corrupt, covert, dual, grey, hidden, household, illegal, illegitimate, 
informal, invisible, irregular, marginal, moonlight, parallel, second, secret, shadow, 
submerged, subterranean, twilight, underground, unobserved, unofficial, 
unrecorded, unreported, unregulated and unsanctioned4. 
 
Some economists and policymakers use these terms interchangeably while others 
prefer to stick to one particular word, with or without an explanation, for their 
choice.  And yet a case could be made for the need to be precise in the choice of 
terminology, since these words can have very specific meanings and are not always 
policy-neutral.  On this latter point, words such as black, shadow, clandestine, and 
subterranean conjure up images of sinister and even seedy activities reminiscent of 
Europe in the aftermath of the second world war, so vividly depicted in Carol 
Reed’s film version of Graham Greene’s novella The Third Man5. 
 
This has obvious implications for policy prescription.  For example, due to the 
negative connotations associated with, say, black economic activity, it follows that 
policymakers, and certainly editors of tabloid newspapers, may wish to outlaw all 
such activity or increase existing penalties6.  Contrast this with cash and household 
which imply nothing about the legality or morality of the associated economic 
activities.  In fact, these sound harmless and even desirable – what could, in the pre-
electronic payments era, be more convenient than transactions executed in cash?  Or 
consider the practical and civil nature of household production. Hence some words 
generate, intentionally or otherwise, vivid images which often reflect either the 
policy bias of the researcher or the prevailing zeitgeist,  whereas other words are 
policy and morally neutral. 
 
Most of the aforementioned terms imply that there is a sharp dichotomy between 
the formal and informal economy.  However, as we shall argue below, there are 
                                                
4.   Many of these terms are listed in Smith (1981) and Smith (1997). 
5. Cowell (1990) makes a similar point when he states that these terms "suggest social undesirability if not innate 
evil… ‘black economy’    (= ‘black deeds?’)… ‘underground activity’ (=‘under the counter’ or ‘under the 
bed?’)" (p.126). 
6.  Again, Cowell (1990) makes a similar point when he states that "insofar as policymakers are responsive to 
opinion… the language influences the strategy and the tactics of enforcement" (p. 126).   4 
strong linkages between formal and informal activities hence the word grey, to be 
used interchangeably with informal, would appear to be a more appropriate term. 
 
Table 1 shows the various activities which we describe as grey or informal.   
Although the list is by no means exhaustive, it does cover the majority of informal 
activities.  Two things stand out: first, the list covers a very disparate group of 
activities, and second the majority of listed activities are clearly criminal. 
 
As we shall see in Section 4, researchers do not always specify whether their 
measurement of informal activity captures all or part of the list in Table 1.  Indeed, 
many studies either avoid defining what they are supposed to be measuring or are 
(perhaps intentionally) vague. This is understandable since it is often difficult, if not 
impossible, to delineate between activities.  For example, those engaged in the 
distribution of narcotics are also likely to be engaged in money laundering in order 
to legitimise their income.  But money laundering is also linked to human trafficking 
and unauthorised arms trading.  Smuggling is obviously linked to the payment of 
bribes, and some unauthorised prostitution to the trafficking of humans.  These 
interlinkages lead some researchers to explicitly exclude criminal activities. 
 
Not only are there interlinkages between various criminal activities, but the 
distinction between criminal and legal activities is blurred.  The clearest example is 
money laundering, which involves the legitimisation of income derived from illegal 
activities.  The legitimisation process can take many forms, some of the most classic 
being the purchase of physical and liquid assets such as property, enterprises7, 
shares in publicly listed companies, etc.  Parts or all of these assets are then resold 
and the proceeds, which are deposited in legitimate bank accounts8 either in 
offshore jurisdictions or mainstream financial centres, are then used to finance 
further illegal activities. 
 
It should also be stressed that for many forms of money laundering to be successful, 
they require the collaboration of lawyers and accountants.  However, the laundering 
‘fees’ of these professionals cannot be disentangled from legitimate income. 
 
Apart from the interlinkages, there is the more obvious problem of data.  Due to the 
very nature of the legitimisation process, it is impossible for economists to 
distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate income for statistical purposes.  The 
                                                
7.  Apart from the purchase of existing enterprises, money launderers sometimes set up new companies, often in 
tax havens. 
8.   Contrary to journalistic folklore, criminals do not turn up at banks with large suitcases full of cash.    5 
data available, be it at the micro level or the macro level, conceal the proceeds of the 
money launderer.  The aggregate figures often mentioned in the media are nothing 
more than "guesstimates" extrapolated from the relatively infrequent cases when 
money launderers are discovered by the authorities.  This is also true of other illegal 
activities.  For example, in commenting on the drug trade in Canada, which in the 
early 1990s was estimated to be worth $10 billion annually, Killam (1997) states the 
following:  "The estimates for Canada could very well be understated.  These figures 
are extrapolated from bits of evidence like the following.  On February 22, 1994, 5.4 
metric tonnes of cocaine were seized off the coast of Nova Scotia, thus eliminating 
approximately 11 million gram doses.   
 
Table 1 -  Informal (or Grey) Activities 
 
 
Tax avoidance (legal) 
•  fringe benefits 
•  legal tax planning, e.g. trusts 
Tax evasion (illegal) 
•  underreporting or non-reporting    
of income 
•   non-issuance of receipts 
•   illegal tax schemes 
Double jobbing/moonlighting 
•  e.g. civil servants 
Home production/services 
•   baby sitting 
•   home hairdressing 
•   cleaning, etc 
Petty unregulated/unreported trading 
and production 
Benefits in kind 




Infringement of copyrights   
•  production of counterfeit goods 
Fraud 
•  Internet fraud 
•  social security fraud, etc 
Work by illegal immigrants  
Production, distribution and sale of 
narcotics 
Corruption 
•  e.g. bribes 
Illegal arms trading 
Money laundering 
Unauthorised gambling 





 Piracy of the seas 
 
Assuming that the cocaine was all destined for Canada we could reasonably expect 
that it would be diluted or "cut" at least once, thus making the total amount 
available for sale 10.8 metric tonnes.  If sold for $25,000/kg, […] the value of this 
shipment […] would be $270 million […].  The value of the same shipment if all sold 
in one-gram doses at $150 […] would be $1 billion, $650 million […] if we estimate   6 
that enforcement officials intercept less than 10 percent of all drugs […] this would 
equal $16 billion, $500 million.  Looking at the 1994 seizure […] the inescapable 
conclusion is surely that the annual underground drug economy in Canada is 
massive and probably underestimated at $10 billion" (pp. 105-106). 
 
Even though Killam was responsible for the Royal Canadian Mountain Police 
(RCMP) Proceeds of Crime Program, his back of the envelope calculations need to 
be treated with some caution because his assumptions need to be verified.  The 
criminal nature of these activities make any assumptions and their concomitant 
extrapolations unreliable. 
 
Given the complex linkages between  and  within  legal and illegal activities, the 
distinction between the formal and informal economy is at best blurred and at worst 
a complex labyrinth.  Hence grey may be a better word since it captures the broad 
variety of activities described by Dixon (1999), while at the same time explicitly 
referring to the fact that the distinction between formal and informal activities 
cannot be easily delineated. 
 
As far as informal is concerned, according to Lubell (1991) the term first came to 
prominence in 1972 when the International Labour Organization (ILO) published a 
study of unregulated entrepreneurial activity in Kenya.  Although the ILO’s use of 
the word was confined to the activities of micro-enterprises in the context of 
developing economies, the term is now used as a synonym for the range of activities 
defined by Dixon (1999). 
 
Another difficulty illustrated by Table 1 is that there are some informal activities 
which, though illegal, can hardly be considered to be seriously criminal.  The 
pensioner who offers gardening services for cash payment or the student who 
provides babysitting services are engaging in tax evasion by not declaring their 
earnings.  However, from the policymaker’s point of view, they are clearly in a 
different category to the well organised criminal gangs living off the proceeds of 
extortion, drug trafficking and smuggling9.  What all these agents have in common 
is that they conceal their income from the authorities.  Thus, from the perspective of 
the economist and statistician, this commonality is sufficient to justify the estimation 
of an aggregate number.  From the perspective of policymakers, who need to weigh 
the potential benefits in terms of increased tax revenues and reduced criminality 
against the costs of enforcing compliance, disaggregate figures would be preferable. 
                                                
9.   Policymakers who are keen on being re-elected will view some forms of criminal activity as less or more 
serious than others depending on how they consider the electorate to perceive them.   7 
3.   Some theoretical background 
A range of factors are assumed to influence the participation of economic agents in 
the grey economy, such as high tax rates; penalties for tax evasion and extent of 
enforcement; the rate of unemployment; poverty; the unavailability of goods and 
services in the formal market; working hours (especially of civil servants); tax 
morality; and cultural attitudes towards the state10.  However, theoretical 
discussions of these and other factors are relatively few11.  Those that have been 
published can be classified into two groups, micro and macro. 
 
Three of the most significant micro theoretical studies that consider the relationship 
between taxation and informal activities are Allingham and Sandmo (1972), Cowell 
(1990), and Andenberg et al. (2003).  
 
The Allingham and Sandmo study attempts to show that an increase in the tax 
burden will lead to an increase in underreported income.  The authors distinguish 
between two types of tax evader: the ‘myopic’ evader, who ignores the potential 
risks in the future; and the ‘consistent’ evader, who realises that by evading taxes 
today he is placing himself in a worse position tomorrow.  By looking at this 
distinction in the context of a dynamic mathematical model, and drawing on 
Becker’s work on the economics of crime as well as Arrow’s work on the economics 
of uncertainty, the authors arrive at the somewhat obvious conclusion that "the 
consistent individual will always declare more than the myopic" (ibid., p. 337).   
Other commonsense conclusions include the statements that "an increase in the 
probability of detection will always lead to a larger income being declared" (p. 330) 
and "a rise in the penalty rate will lead to an increase in declared income" (p. 332). 
 
Allingham and Sandmo’s model has been very influential, albeit indirectly, since 
many empirical studies are based on the assumption that the informal economy is 
directly proportional to the tax burden or to tax enforcement. 
 
The second of our micro studies is that of Cowell (1990) who, in a very rigorous and 
widely cited analysis of tax evasion, assumes that the tax evader is a gambler (or at 
least behaves like one) in the sense that the decision of a rational taxpayer to evade 
the payment of taxes will depend on the probability of getting caught, and thus 
suffering the consequent financial and/or penalty.   
                                                
10. Some of these are mentioned by Frey and Weck-Hanneman (1984), Loayza (1996) and Ernste and Schneider 
(1998). 
11. There is, however, a significant body of theoretical literature on the closely related topic of crime.  For 
example, see Ehrlich and Liu et al (2004).  For a survey of the literature on corruption, see Aidt (2003).   8 
Cowell begins with a simple two-agent model, government and taxpayers, in which: 
a) the taxpayer is assumed to have a fixed gross income which is liable to tax; b) 
income tax is proportional to income; c) the probability of tax evasion being 
discovered and punished is fixed; and d) the amount of tax on concealed income is 
subject to a surcharge.  Making additional assumptions about the taxpayer’s utility 
function and the relationship between risk aversion and consumption, Cowell uses 
mathematical analysis to conclude "that people with higher risk tend to evade more" 
(ibid., p. 60).  He then proceeds to expand the model by introducing additional and 
more realistic assumptions which lead him to draw further insights into the 
behaviour of tax evaders.  Some of these assumptions are, like those of Allingham 
and Sandmo, of the commonsense variety, e.g. "the greater the inequality of income 
will induce greater evasion" (Cowell, 1990, p. 107).  Other findings however have 
clear policy implications.  For example, "If the authorities tighten up on the 
enforcement of the tax law, then some taxpayers will switch from evasion to 
avoidance […] and, on the whole, it will be the risk-averse and the rich who… can 
afford the financial advice […] required in order to make the switch" (ibid., p. 178). 
 
A more recent micro-theoretical study is that of Anderberg et al. (2003).  The authors 
confine their analysis to informal activities which are illegal, thus ignoring legal 
household production and tax avoidance, for example.  They provide a micro-
founded framework to study the relationship between tax policy and the informal 
economy, arguing that tax rates are less important in determining grey activities 
than tax enforcement, a point similar to that made by Allingham and Sandmo 
(1972).  However, tax policy and enforcement are complementary in their model. 
 
Anderberg et al.’s study can be criticised in various ways. Some of the assumptions 
they make seem unrealistic, even when taking into account the theoretical context of 
their model.  For example, they assume that the poor are more engaged in tax 
evasion than other socio-economic groups.  Even if we accept this assumption, the 
rich are more likely to account for a larger proportion of concealed income and 
hence a larger percentage of lost tax revenues to the state. 
 
One of the few macro-theoretical analyses is McGee and Feige (1989) who discuss 
the ‘unrecorded’ economy in the framework of the Phillips curve.  In response to the 
stagflation in western economies during the 1970s, the authors attempt to show that 
macroeconomic policies which ignore the informal economy are a form of ‘policy 
illusion’ which can result in stagflation in the formal economy. They develop a 
model in which different scenarios are analysed according to whether the informal 
activities are exogenously or endogenously determined.  The authors use the   9 
Phillips curve to show that monetary and fiscal policies based on automatic 
stabilisers can produce destabilising effects when they are contaminated by 
inaccurate information due to the presence of informal economic activity. 
 
How should governments avoid policy illusion?  According to McGee and Feige, by 
"eliminating the unrecorded sector so that the reliability of the information system is 
restored or by measuring correctly the magnitude of the existing distortion and 
recalibrating policy instruments" (1989, p. 98, my italics).  What policymakers should 
refrain from is shifting from one policy to another without first ascertaining whether 
the measured economy accurately reflects the actual economy.  Adopting new 
policies may simply create new problems or, as McGee and Feige put it in the 
context of a shift from a full-employment monetary target to a price stability target, 
"such a shift in policy […] can alleviate the problem of stagflation at the cost of high 
interest rates and burgeoning deficits" (p. 97). 
 
The implications of McGee and Feige’s comments is that if the hidden economy 
distorts economic policies, then there will, by implication, be a vicious cycle of 
hidden activities leading to inappropriate monetary and fiscal policies which in turn 
lead to a larger unrecorded economy, and so on.  And yet despite this theoretical 
prognosis, there is no convincing empirical study linking the size of the informal 
economy in developed economies with economic instability12. 
 
The theoretical literature has, with the exception of Allingham and Sandmo, had a 
relatively minor impact on the large number of empirical studies.  These studies can 
be categorised under an expanding number of methodologies, and it is to these that 
we now turn our attention. 
 
4.   Proliferating methodologies  
Depending on how and what one chooses, there are about 14 methodologies which 
have been used to estimate the size of the grey economy.  Table 2 presents a 
taxonomy of these methodologies together with examples of studies.  We have 
classified them under six headings: direct surveys/audits; monetary measures; 
                                                
12. The vast body of literature on the causes of economic instability has yet to incorporate the notion of an 
‘unrecorded’ economy as even a peripheral let alone central explanation.  Instead, most studies focus on the 
factors inherent in the dynamics of the capitalist system.  For a recent example, see Cowling (2006) and the 
references therein.  There is also the counterargument that the informal economy, far from resulting in 
economic instability, may actually help stimulate economic activity which would otherwise not be 
undertaken.  For example, Dilnot & Morris (1981) state that "The existence of small amounts of economic 
activity on which the marginal rate of tax is zero, much of which would simply not be undertaken at all if it 
were confined to the formal economy, may reduce the disincentive effects of taxation and add to social 
relationships" (p. 72).  Matthews (1982) follows a similar line of argument, but in the context of 
unemployment; for a critique of Matthews, see Thomas (1988).   10
income and expenditure measures; indirect non-monetary indicators/measures; 
multiple indicators-multiple causes (MIMIC) models based on the concept of latent 
variables; and labour market studies which compare the official with the actual 
labour force.  Alternative taxonomies include the distinction between micro and 
macro approaches or between direct and indirect methods, or a combination of 
these.  The taxonomy we use is very broad in order to accommodate the ever 
increasing number of methodologies. 
 
4.1  Direct surveys/audits 
4.1.1  Micro-surveys of the informal sector 
Lubell (1991) argues that the definition of the informal economy used by researchers 
in developing countries is not always based on a legal definition but rather refers to 
entrepreneurial activity and is identified by two characteristics:  (i) small size (micro-
scale) and (ii) the extent to which an enterprise avoids official regulations and taxes.  
If informal activities are defined to exclude criminal activity there are, according to 
Lubell, similarities between the grey economy in developed countries and the 
informal economy in the developing world (e.g. smallscale production, sub-
contracting, no accounts kept, etc.). 
 
Most of the studies discussed by Lubell (1991) are concerned with the informal 
sector in the urban centres of less developed countries (LDCs), and take the form of 
surveys based on questionnaires completed by field workers.  After surveying the 
studies, Lubell concludes that: 
 
(i)  informal activities absorb between 40% and 60% of the urban labour force; 
(ii)  petty trading and manufacturing are the main activities in the informal 
sector; 
(iii)  the heads of informal enterprises earn more than the official minimum wage 
or the average wage in the formal sector, but employees earn less; 
(iv)  there are strong backward linkages to formal sector supplies, but only weak 
forward ones. 
 
The field studies provide interesting insights into petty trading and manufacturing 
in LDCs but, owing to the definition of the informal sector adopted by Lubell (1991) 
and the authors of the numerous studies he surveys, they tell us little about the 
extent of criminal activities, a significant factor in many LDCs.  However, some of 
the studies discussed by Lubell allude to the corruption of local government or 
police officials in the context of the regulation of trading and manufacturing. More   11
the importantly, the studies also make it clear that there is a close relationship 
between informal activities and poverty. 
 
Table 2 - Taxonomy of methodologies 
 
Direct Surveys/Audits 
•  Micro-surveys of informal sector 
 
•  Tax audits 
Monetary Measures 
•  Denomination of bank notes 
•  Currency ratio/demand method 
 
•  Transactions method 
 
Income & Expenditure Measures 
•  GDP income/expenditure   
discrepancies 
•  Household income/expenditure 
          discrepancies  
•  Consumer  expenditure: single  
equation approach 
•  Consumer expenditure: demand 
system approach 
 
Indirect Non-monetary Indicators/ 
Measures 
•  Ranking Method 
•  Electricity Consumption 
•  Detection-controlled Estimation 
 
MIMIC/Latent Variable Models 
 





Surveys discussed in Lubell (1991), University  
of Laval study (1986) 
Inland Revenue Service (US) 
 
Journalists, among others 
Cagan (1958), Gutmann (1977), Tanzi (1980, 1983), 
and Bhattacharyya (1990, 1999) 






Dilnot and Morris (1981) 
 
Pissarides and Weber (1989) 
 




Frey and Hannelore Weck (1983) 
Johnson et al. (1997) 
Feinstein (1999) 
 
Frey and Weck-Hanneman (1984),  
Giles (1999a, 1999b), Chaudhuri et al. (2006) 
Contini (1981, 1989) 
 
Very few direct surveys of the grey economy in developed countries have been 
undertaken.  One such survey was conducted in 1986 by three economists at   12
Quebec’s Université Laval and reported by Smith (1997)13.  A questionnaire was 
completed anonymously by 2,134 respondents in Quebec14.  Of these respondents, 
31% acknowledged that they had engaged in some form of grey economic activity, 
either as consumers or as suppliers of goods and services.  The survey also revealed 
that the average declared income of workers in the Quebec grey economy was 50% 
of the sample average.  The survey led the Laval economists to conclude that the 
grey economy of Quebec was about 1.4% of Quebec’s GDP. 
 
The key issue that the Laval study highlights is of course to what extent the veracity 
of the respondents can be trusted.  Specifically, the income declared by covert 
workers may be underreported, and some of the remaining 69% of respondents who 
did not confirm participating in the grey economy were possibly not revealing the 
truth.  In any case, the number of such direct surveys are too few to draw any 
general conclusions about their usefulness given these reservations. 
 
4.1.2  Tax audits  
An example of a tax audit is the Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Program 
(TCMP) conducted by the Inland Revenue Service (IRS) in the United States.   
TCMPs are intensive audits conducted for both households and small businesses 
using a large sample15. 
 
The TCMP statistics are used to estimate the value of taxes owed but not paid (the 
tax gap).  The tax gap for households in the late 1980s was reported by Feinstein 
(1999) to be in excess of $100 billion, although the specific years are not reported 
exactly. 
 
The IRS method has numerous drawbacks, including the following: 
 
(i)  A tax audit cannot, for obvious reasons, collect data on criminal activities. 
(ii)  The tax yield is likely to be less compared with ordinary audits.  Feinstein 
(1999) points out that in 1988 the TCMP audit produced an average yield of 
$300 compared with $5,500 for ordinary audits in the mid-1990s. 
(iii)  The marginal cost of a TCMP audit is, according to Feinstein (1999), lower than 
the marginal benefit. 
(iv)  The sample may not be representative of the population16.   
                                                
13. The Italian Statistical Office has also carried out some direct surveys. 
14. Smith does not however state how many questionnaires were distributed. 
15. Feinstein (1999) reports that the 1988 TCMP involved the auditing of 50,000 households. 
16. This is a problem with all audits and surveys and is not unique to the TCMP.   13
(v)  Such audits can only provide point estimates of tax evasion rather than time 
series data for all informal activities. 
 
4.2  Monetary measures 
Monetary measures have tended to be the most widely used estimates of the 
informal economy.  These measures can be classified into three categories: the 
currency ratio/demand method and the transactions method, which are the most 
widely used, and a more minor category, the denomination of banknotes indicator, 
which we briefly consider first. 
 
4.2.1  Denomination of banknotes 
It has been argued that the volume of large denomination banknotes in circulation 
provides a good indication of the level of informal economic activity.  Any increase 
in the volume indicates an increase in the informal economy.  However, the problem 
with this hypothesis is that it naively assumes that illegal economic transactions are 
facilitated in cash only, thus ignoring barter, cheques and, in the electronic age, 
credit cards.  It also ignores the various legitimate reasons why the demand for large 
denominations may at various times increase.  For example, Dilnot and Morris 
(1981) and O’Higgins (1989) argue that inflation results in people holding more cash 
and, specifically, larger denominations.  A more general criticism is that such an 
approach cannot provide an accurate estimate of the size of the informal economy, 
but only a very rough indication of its prevalence17.   
 
One of the main reasons why large denominations are commonly believed to play a 
role in the informal economy can be directly ascribed to journalists18, whose 
reporting of criminal activities has tended to play on such myths. 
 
4.2.2  Currency ratio/demand method 
Cagan (1958) was the first to develop the currency ratio method when he attempted 
to explain the long-term variation of the ratio of currency to the money supply in the 
US. 
 
Following a decline from the 1870s to 1930, the currency ratio in the US increased 
significantly over the next 15 years.  From a low of about 7% in 1930, it rose to 20% 
during the Second World War.  In considering the causes of these movements in the 
ratio, Cagan looked at a large number of explanatory variables including the cost of 
                                                
17. MacAfee (1980) also casts doubts on the usefulness of taking large denominations to measure informal 
economic activity. 
18.  For example, Dilnot and Morris (1981) cite two articles, one in Fortune on 9 October 1978 and the other in the 
Financial Times on 9 April 1979.   14
holding currency, the volume of retail trade, the volume of travel, tax evasion 
arising from taxes on transactions, and black markets.  Using a simple statistical 
analysis based on time-series data, Cagan concluded that "a price and income 
variable […] have been major determinants of the demand for currency relative to 
deposits" (ibid., p. 327).  However, these two variables, which are used as proxies for 
some of the explanatory variables mentioned above, "cannot explain exceptional 
wartime increases in the currency ratio" (ibid.).  This led Cagan to conclude that 
"Only attempts to conceal income payments in order to evade high tax rates seem 
capable of creating enough additional demand for currency to account for the 
wartime increases" (ibid.). 
 
Although Cagan’s paper was published in 1958, it was not until Gutmann’s 1977 
paper that measuring the grey economy started to become a popular topic for 
economic research19. 
 
Gutmann (1977) defines the ‘subterranean’ economy as the "vast amount of 
nonreported income and nonreported work and employment" (p. 26).  When 
discussing the participants in the subterranean economy, Gutmann includes 
potentially anyone involved in cash transactions, e.g. "retailing, personal services 
[…] illegal and quasi legal activities […] Restaurants, car washing […] garages, bars 
[…] payments for part-time work […] bribes" (ibid.). 
 
Unlike Cagan, Gutmann does not use statistical analysis, but simply decomposes the 
US money supply, M1, into two components, currency and demand deposits, and 
looks at their movement as well as the ratio of currency to deposits over the period 
1937-76.  Following a low of $219 of currency per $1,000 of demand deposits in 1941, 
the ratio rose to $363 per $1,000 in 1945.  After declining in the post-war period, it 
continued to rise steadily after 1961.  Guttman’s explanation for the increase in the 
circulation of currency, especially after 1961, is that it "lubricates a […] whole 
subterranean economy" (p. 26).   This explanation is based on the assumption that 
the period 1937-41 was "normal".  In other words, during this period the currency 
demand for illegal purposes was zero.   
 
There are several shortcomings with Gutmann’s analysis which we shall discuss 
later, after considering other studies using the currency ratio/demand approach.  
However, at this juncture it is worth highlighting that there is a clear political 
agenda underlying Gutmann’s estimates.  For example, his introduction states: "The 
                                                
19.  Interestingly, Gutmann (1977) makes no reference to Cagan (1958).   15
subterranean economy […] was created by government rules and restrictions.  It is a 
creature of the income tax, of other taxes, of limitations on the legal employment of 
certain groups and of prohibitions on certain activities" (p.  27).  And he continues, 
"we should recognize that the subterranean economy is created by government […] 
We should admit that the increasing public contempt for the tax system and 
government regulation is causing the subterranean economy to grow more rapidly" 
(ibid.).  Thus the policy implications are clear: reduce income tax, and reduce 
regulations. 
 
One of the most influential studies using the cash ratio approach is that of Tanzi 
(1980), whose starting point is the relationship between the demand for currency 
and taxes.  Assuming that economic agents engage in "underground" activities in 
order to circumvent their tax obligations, an estimate of the tax elasticity of currency 
demand can then be used to calculate the stock of currency held in the informal 
sector.  Following in the steps of Cagan (1958), Tanzi uses time-series data to run a 
simple econometric equation.  The dependent variable is the ratio of currency to 
deposits, using M2 as the measure of the money supply. 
 
Although Tanzi gives prominence to tax evasion as the motivating force for informal 
economic activity, he also includes three other explanatory variables: per capita 
income; the ratio of total wages and salaries in personal income; and the rate of 
interest on time deposits.  An increase in real per capita income results in a fall in the 
currency ratio.  The ratio of total wages and salaries in personal income is assumed 
to be positively related to the currency ratio since wages are paid predominantly in 
cash, and the rate of interest on time deposits is used as a measure of the 
opportunity cost of holding cash. 
 
Tanzi’s model for the period 1929-76 is: 
 
( 1n R n a Y n a W n a T n a a M C o 1 1 1 1 ) 2 / 4 3 2 1 + + + + =                                          (1) 
 
where C  is the stock of currency holdings, T is a tax variable, W represents the share 
of wages and salaries in personal income, Y is real per capita income, and R is the 
rate of interest on time deposits. 
 
All the independent variables except Y  are found to be significant, which leads 
Tanzi to state that (1) establishes "a connection between changes in the level of 
income taxes and changes in the  2 / M C  ratio.  This connection can be attributed to   16
the existence of a tax induced ‘underground’ or ‘subterranean’ economy in which 
transactions are carried out mainly through the use of currency" (ibid., pp. 444-45). 
 
Assuming that the income velocity of money in the underground economy is the 
same as that in the legal economy, then the size of the former can be approximated 
by multiplying the income velocity of money in the legal economy by the stock of 
money in the underground sector.  Tanzi does this by first solving equation (1) for 
the 1976 values of the independent variables, and then by obtaining predicted 
values for C . The difference between predicted and actual values that can be 
attributed to underground economic activity.  Tanzi estimates the size of the US 
underground economy to be between 3.4% and 5.1% of GNP. 
 
In Tanzi (1983) two equations similar to (1) but using an adjusted tax variable are 
estimated, and the period extended to 1980.  In one equation, the adjusted tax term 
is  ) 1 ( TW +  and in the other equation is  ) 1 ( T + , where TW is the weighted average 
tax rate on interest income and T is the ratio of total income tax to adjusted gross 
income.  Estimating the equation with  ) 1 ( TW + , Tanzi calculates the underground 
economy to be between 5.19% and 6.07% of GNP for the period 1977-1980, whereas 
the equation with  ) 1 ( T +  provides an estimate of between 3.60% and 4.49% of GNP. 
 
A variant of the Cagan (1958) and Tanzi (1980, 1983) approaches is that of 
Bhattarachyya (1990).  This is a more sophisticated study which departs from the 
currency demand estimations of Cagan and Tanzi in two important respects: first, it 
deliberately excludes taxation as an explanatory variable; and second, the modelling 
strategy and procedure rely heavily on appropriate diagnostic testing. 
 
Assuming that transactions in the underground economy take the form of cash 
payments, Bhattacharyya (1990) writes the maintained hypothesis as: 
 
UR R M M M + =                                               (2) 
 
where  M  is the total demand for currency and  R M  and  UR M  represent the demand 
for currency in the recorded and unrecorded sectors, respectively.  Assuming that a) 
the demand for money in the recorded economy is a function of income  ), ( R Y  a 
short-term rate of interest  ), (R  and the retail price index  ), (P  and b) the demand for 
money in the unrecorded economy is a function of underground income  ) ( h Y , 
Bhattacharyya derives the following equation: 
   17
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β β δ β + =  is a dummy variable included to pick up the 
structural break at the end of the 1973 oil crisis, and  t ε  and  t v  are disturbance terms.  
The estimates obtained from (3) are found to satisfy a variety of diagnostic tests 
including the Lagrange Multiplier test for serial correlation and the Autoregressive 
Conditional Heteroscedasticity test. 
 
Using the results of (3) and the assumption that  , 1 Rt ht Y Y α Σ =  Bhattacharyya reports 
estimates for the underground economy on a quarterly basis.  As a percentage of 
recorded GNP the estimates vary from 3.75% in the second quarter of 1960 to a peak 
of 11.13% in the first quarter of 1977.  Between the first quarter of 1978 and the 
fourth quarter of 1984 the estimates vary from 10.91% to 7.65%. 
 
The currency ratio/demand approach has been criticised for the following reasons: 
 
(i)  In the case of Gutmann (1977), the assumption that there is a period during 
which there was no informal activity is clearly absurd (see Thomas, 1999). 
(ii)  Gutmann offers no explanation for his assumption that the velocity of 
circulation is the same in both the formal and informal economies. 
(iii)  Thomas (1989) points out that the estimates of Gutmann (1977), Tanzi (1980, 
1983) and other currency demand studies using US data may in fact be 
measuring the underground economy of other countries rather than that of 
the US.  This is especially so in the case of Latin America, where US dollar 
holdings are large due to the currency’s popularity as a hedge against 
political and economic instability, added to which is its widespread use in 
money laundering related to the drugs trade. 
(iv)  The approach is based on the grossly unrealistic assumption that transactions 
are purely carried out in cash (see Porter and Bayer, 1989, Ernste and 
Schneider, 1998 and Thomas, 1999). 
(v)  In the case of Tanzi (1983), Thomas (1986 and 1989) and Porter and Bayer 
(1989) show that the econometric model is misspecified and unstable. 
(vi)  Bhatacharrya (1990) is a technically more advanced study than its 
predecessors, but suffers from much the same problem, i.e. it lacks theoretical   18
foundations.  Thus, "Bhattacharrya has nothing to offer policymakers in terms 
of links between the black economy and its economic causes" (Thomas, 1999, 
p. 386).  
 
4.2.3  Transactions method 
An alternative to the currency ratio/demand approach is that of the monetary 
transactions method developed by Feige (1979, 1980 and 1989b), which concentrates 
on the volume of payments rather than changes in the demand for currency.  Feige’s 
starting point is Fisher’s equation of exchange,  PT MV = .  If independent estimates 
of MV  and PT are not equal then the discrepancy can be attributed to underground 
economic activity.  If, however, PT (which includes both formal and informal 
transactions) cannot be estimated, then estimates of MV can still be used to ascertain 
the size of the underground sector. 
 
Feige (1989b) summarises the procedure as follows: let 
 
U R T Y Y Y + =                              ( 4 )  
 
where  T Y is total income,  R Y  is recorded income and  U Y  is unrecorded income.  Also 
assume that PT is made up of transactions using cash and cheques.  We can then 
write: 
 
d c DV CV PT + =                           ( 5 )  
 
where  C  is the stock of currency, D represents checkable deposits,  c V  is the 
currency velocity and  d V  is the checkable deposit velocity.  Assuming total 
transactions to be proportional to total income and using the Cambridge version of 
Fisher’s equation i.e.  K Y PT = / , together with (4) and (5), Feige obtains: 
 
R d c U Y K DV CV Y − + = )] / ) [(                      ( 6 )  
 
Given estimates of total payments and recorded income, we can estimate the size of 
the underground economy.  However, as can be seen from (6),  U Y  cannot be 
estimated unless K  is known.  To overcome this problem, Feige assumes that there 
was a period during which all income was properly recorded.  In Feige (1979, 1980) 
he opts for 1939 as the benchmark year for which he calculates K  to be 10.3.  By 
estimating  PT and substituting the value of K  into equation (6), the underground   19
economy is estimated to be between 13.2% and 21.7% of GNP in 1976 and between 
25.5% and 33.1% in 1978.  In Feige (1989b) the period of estimation is extended to 
1981, and the author concludes that the informal economy in the United States is 
"between $280 billion and $420 billion, amounting to 16-24% of reported gross 
income in 1981" (Feige, 1989b, p.54). 
 
The assumptions underlying Feige’s estimates have been criticised by Thomas (1989) 
and Porter and Bayer (1989) for lacking empirical validity. Tanzi (1983) also suggests 
that Feige’s estimates are sensitive to the choice of initial period.  The criticism made 
by Thomas (1989) of the currency ratio/demand method mentioned in sub-section 
4.2.3, namely that the widespread use of the dollar in countries other than the US 
distorts any analysis of the informal economy in the US, applies here as well. 
Indeed, in a later study Feige (1997) concedes that between 25% and 45% of US 
currency is held abroad. 
 
4.3  Income and expenditure measures 
4.3.1  GDP income/expenditure discrepancies 
Starting with the assumption that the income measure of GDP is supposed to be the 
same as the expenditure measure, some economists have argued that any 
discrepancy between the two measures, specifically if income GDP is larger than 
expenditure GDP, indicates the existence of a "hidden" economy. 
 
A widely cited study using this approach is that of MacAfee (1980), who defines the 
hidden economy as "the economic activity generating factor incomes which cannot 
be estimated from the regular statistical sources used to compile the income measure 
of gross domestic product" (p.81).   MacAfee considers the problem of including 
criminal activities in his definition  and concludes: "The difficulties of measurement, 
combined with the incongruity of relating an increase in crime with an increase in 
economic activity, suggest that the inclusion of crime…is problematical and that 
estimates of value added arising from crime should await better data" (1980, p. 84, my 
italics).   
 
MacAfee (1980) proceeds on the assumption that the expenditure measure of GDP in 
the UK is unbiased because it is compiled using the Family Expenditure Survey 
(FES), which is supposedly reliable.  Respondents to the FES have, according to 
MacAfee, little reason to lie except in the case of sensitive items.  Any 
underreporting is thus likely to be small.  In contrast, the income measure of GDP is 
compiled using data from the UK’s Department of Inland Revenue.  Thus, there is 
far more scope for underreporting actual income, especially by the self-employed.   20
 
The difference between UK estimates of GDP based on expenditure and those based 
on income is called the ‘initial residual difference’ (IRD).  The IRD is, according to 
MacAfee (1980), affected by underreporting of factor incomes, timing errors 
(transactions recorded in different time periods), and other estimation errors (e.g. 
sampling errors). MacAfee shows that the IRD as a percentage of the expenditure 
measure of GDP increased significantly in the UK from less than 0.3% in 1960 to 
almost 4% in 1974, and then declined between 1974 and 1978. 
 
MacAfee’s methodology is however problematic because: 
 
(i)  it excludes criminal activities; 
(ii)  it does not address the fact that timing differences in transactions can affect 
the survey results, as the author indeed concedes (see Dilnot and Morris, 
1981); 
(iii)  it assumes that the FES data are unbiased. 
 
A more general criticism is offered by Thomas (1999), who points out that (i) the two 
measures of national income are not statistically independent, sharing similar 
components; and (ii) sometimes national income can be larger than national 
expenditure, as has been the case in Switzerland, implying a negative black 
economy.  Tanzi (1999) argues that GDP data are sometimes subject to political 
interference.  This is particularly true in some developing countries when seeking to 
obtain credit from the main lending institutions such as the IMF and the World 
Bank.  Even in developed economies, allegations of data manipulation are not 
unknown. 
 
4.3.2  Household income/expenditure discrepancies 
As an alternative to looking at GDP income/expenditure discrepancies, Dilnot and 
Morris (1981) use a disaggregated analysis which examines the income and 
expenditure behaviour of individuals. The authors begin with a detailed analysis of 
1,000 households taken from the FES, and then extend the analysis to the whole FES 
sample of 7,200 households. Dilnot and Morris do not clearly define what they mean 
by ‘black’ economic activity, although they do state that: "Our approach, in 
principle, includes […] tax evasion and social security fraud" (ibid., p. 66). 
 
Having examined and corrected the data for deficiencies, Dilnot and Morris analyse 
a sample of households whose expenditure exceeds 1.15 of their reported income.    21
They then estimate the size of the UK black economy in 1977 to be between 2.3% and 
3% of GNP. 
 
The main drawback of this approach is that, just like MacAfee (1980), it assumes that 
the FES is a reliable source of information.  But as the authors admit: "we must 
expect that […] individuals with something to hide will be more reluctant to 
respond to an official survey […] and therefore the Family Expenditure Survey 
under-represents the black economy" (Dilnot and Morris, 1981, p. 68).  After having 
considered the figures for the self-employed, they add: "self-employment is under-
reported in FES" (ibid., p.72). 
 
4.3.3  Consumer expenditure: the single equation approach 
Whereas Dilnot and Morris (1981) analyse discrepancies between total household 
income and expenditure, Pissarides and Weber (1989) use a single equation 
consumption function for food to estimate the size of the black economy in the UK. 
The black economy is defined as consisting of "activity that should normally be 
reported and taxed but is not" (ibid.,  p.18).  For empirical purposes, the authors 
assume that "only the self-employed under-report their income" (ibid.). 
 
Pissarides and Weber use data from the FES to estimate consumption functions for 
food which are then inverted to calculate actual rather than reported income. Food 
expenditure is chosen on the assumption that it is more accurately recorded than 
other items of expenditure.  "It is highly unlikely that the person filling in the diary 
[…] will conceal some seemingly small food expenditure for tax reasons" (ibid., p. 
18). 
 
The consumption function estimated is as follows: 
 
i i j i t j j a i j i SE Y n Z C n η γ β + + + = 1 1                              (7) 
 
where  j i C  is the consumption of item  j  by household i,  Z  is a vector of household 
characteristics,  j a  is a vector of parameters,  j β  is the marginal propensity to 
consume good  ti Y j,  is the after tax income of household  SE i,  is a dummy for the 
self-employed (1 if the head of the household is self-employed, and 0 if the head of 
the household is an employee), and  i η  is an error term. 
 
Equation (7) is estimated for blue and white collar households. Based on the 
estimates, Pissarides and Weber (1989) draw the following conclusions:   22
 
(i)  The self-employed spend more on food than employees; 
  (ii)   The standard deviation of income for the self-employed is twice as high as for 
employees; 
(iii)  The marginal propensity to consume is similar for employees and the self-
employed; 
(iv)  The self-employed consume more than employees, after adjusting for income 
and household characteristics. 
 
They then use the results to calculate the variances and covariances of the average 
underreported income for white and blue collar households, and find that the mid-
point estimate for mean underreporting, in other words the black economy 
coefficient, is 1.55. This produces an estimate of the size of the UK black economy at 
5.5% of GDP. 
 
There are a number of shortcomings with this method:   
 
(i)  As the authors acknowledge, some employees may be engaged in self-
employment, thus concealing their true income. 
(ii)  The authors’ confidence that food expenditure is accurately reported could 
well be misplaced.  Anyone underreporting their income may also be 
underreporting their expenditure. In the case of food this would apply to 
expensive items.  There is also the related issue of where food is consumed.  
Not all food is consumed in the home or in restaurants: some is also consumed 
at the workplace. 
(iii)  The method ignores savings.  Households could be financing the consumption 
of luxury food items from their savings and not from current income. 
(iv)  As Lyssiotou et al. (2004) note, the method assumes homogeneous preferences 
or, as they put it, "An important limitation of the simple linear equation 
approach […] is that it imposes separability in the components of income. […] 
This implies absence of preference heterogeneity associated with the sources of 
income: all differences in consumer demand are attributed to differences in 
(mis)reported income" (ibid., p. 628, my italics).  They correctly go on to point 
out that, for any given level of income, expenditure can vary between 
households due to a number of demographic and other characteristics, such as 
the age profile of a household, housing tenure, geographical location, etc. (ibid., 
p. 629)20. 
                                                
20. This applies not only to food consumption but to "any peculiarity associated with the pattern of spending 
that does not reflect misreporting of household income".   23
4.3.4  Consumer expenditure: the demand system approach 
To avoid some of the problems associated with the single equation approach, 
Lyssiotou  et al. (2004) use a complete demand system based on cross-sectional 
individual household data from the FES. They argue that the advantages of a 
complete demand system over the single equation method are that it avoids bias 
arising from confusing preference heterogeneity with income effects, and that it 
dispenses with the need to categorise households by source of income.  The authors 
define the black economy as "economic activities that are hidden from public 
authorities to avoid taxation" (ibid., p. 622).  
  
Lyssiotou et al. (2004) consider two sources of income (wages and self-employment 
income) and six categories of non-durable goods (food, alcohol, fuel, clothing, 
personal goods/services and leisure goods/services).  They then estimate the 
following demand system: 
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where  h i ω  is the budget share for good i in household h;  z is the vector of 
household characteristics (age of household head, location, occupation, etc.); 
w
h y  and 
s
h y  are the wage and self-employment proportions of observed household income 
h Y ;  i δ is the preference heterogeneity associated with self-employment income; θ  is 
the black economy coefficient (i.e. the factor by which the observed income must be 
multiplied in order to equal actual income); and  h i υ  is an error term21. 
 
The estimation of (8) leads Lyssiotou et al. (2004)  to derive values for the black 
economy coefficients of 2.18 for blue collar households and 1.64 for white collar 
households.  These values are then used to calibrate the size of the black economy in 
the UK as 10.6% of GDP, which is about double the estimate provided by Pissarides 
and Weber (1989), and over three times the value calculated by Dilnot and Morris 
(1981).   
 
In justifying their methodology, Lyssiotou et al. (2004) state that it avoids the 
criticism of measurement without theory because it "is based on sound principles of 
consumer behaviour" (p. 624).  While we would not dispute the methodology’s link 
to consumer theory, it is a purely statistical exercise that, like Pissarides and Weber 
                                                
21. For a full explanation of all the parameters, see Lyssiotou et al. (2004).  Our intention is to give the reader a 
flavour of the approach rather than a full technical description.   24
(1989), has little to say about how the informal economy functions.  There are also 
several other significant problems: 
 
(i)  A demand system approach requires much more information than the single 
equation methodology they are trying to improve on, as the authors 
acknowledge.  This can lead to measurement error problems. 
(ii)  Their sample choice deliberately excludes pensioners and single parents on the 
grounds that they wish to avoid "preference peculiarities" (ibid., p. 629).   
However, it is precisely pensioners and single parents who have a strong 
incentive to participate in informal activities. 
(iii)  The results for the preference heterogeneity effects lead the authors to conclude 
that the higher self-employed income is in a household, the higher the share of 
necessities (food and fuel) in expenditure.  "Possibly this is because these 
households tend to have life styles favouring more spending on necessities 
rather than luxuries" (ibid., pp. 634-35).  This statement is however completely 
counter- intuitive.  
 
4.4  Indirect Non-monetary Indicators/Measures 
4.4.1  Ranking method 
Frey and Hannelore Weck (1983) use a combination of weights and sensitivity 
analyses to rank countries in terms of the prevalence of the ‘shadow’ economy.  The 
weights are "inferred on the basis of the knowledge gained from the literature" (ibid., 
p. 28), and the sensitivity analysis is based on "various determinants in the writings 
on the subject" (ibid.).   
 
The novelty and shortcomings of this method is acknowledged by Frey and 
Hannelore Weck when they state: "While the procedure used here may seem 
unfamiliar and naïve to economists, it is considered scientifically acceptable in 
psychology" (ibid.,  p . 2 9 ) .   I t  i s  o f  l i t t l e  s u r p r i s e  t h a t  t h i s  a p p r o a c h  h a s  n o t  b e e n  
widely adopted.  Moreover, for the policymaker, the knowledge that one’s country 
is ranked as having a ‘large’, ‘medium’, or ‘small’ informal economy is of no help in 
the design of appropriate policies. The ranking method was a precursor of the 
MIMIC model method, which we discuss in sub-section 4.5. 
 
4.4.2  Electricity consumption 
Johnson et al. (1997) look at the ‘unofficial’ economy in transition economies. The 
unofficial economy constitutes any "activity that is not reported to the state 
statistical office" and "is almost never reported to the tax authorities" (ibid., p. 173).  
The word "activity" is used to refer to entrepreneurial activity in the production of   25
goods by firms, and does not preclude corruption in the form of bribes. The authors 
assume that economic agents switch from formal to informal activity due to 
taxation, government regulation and the unavailability of public goods.   
 
Using electricity consumption as a proxy for overall GDP, Johnson et al. (1997) 
compare this with actual GDP.  The difference between the two represents the size 
of the unofficial economy. The use of electricity consumption as a proxy for total 
economic activity is justified on the grounds that "around the world, the short-run 
electricity-to-GDP elasticity is usually close to 1" (Johnson et al., 1997, p. 174). 
 
We shall not dwell on the obvious shortcomings of this methodology22 other than to 
quote Weitzman (1997), who states "It would be easy to spend time taking potshots 
at this kind of methodology because it offers a big, fat target" (p. 231, my italics). 
 
4.4.3  Detection-controlled estimation 
This approach attempts to measure the extent of tax non-compliance.  Hence, like 
the ranking method and the denomination of banknotes approach, it does not 
provide a direct estimate of the size of the informal economy.  The methodology, a 
summary of which is contained in Feinstein (1999), consists in setting up a model 
with two mathematical expressions: 
 
  1)  Potential offenders with a specified probability of violation (non-compliance); 
2) Monitors (regulators) with a specified probability of detection, conditional on 
non-compliance occurring. 
 
The two expressions are jointly estimated and the resulting values are used to 
construct an estimate of the proportion of violations which have not been detected.  
Feinstein acknowledges two major drawbacks with this methodology.  First, it is a 
purely statistical approach with no reference to the reasons for non-compliance.   
Second, it suffers from the problem of identification.  This is because it "decomposes 
a single observable variable, detected violations, into two disjoint causal 
expressions, violation and detection" (ibid., p. 366). 
 
Detection-controlled estimation can at best only provide an indication of the extent 
of tax evasion, rather than a measurement of it.  Hence, it needs to be used in 
conjunction with other more direct approaches. 
 
                                                
22.  See Ernste and Schneider (1998) for specific criticisms.   26
4.5  MIMIC models 
MIMIC models draw heavily on the theory of latent (or unobserved) variables in 
econometrics.  In general, MIMIC models are made up of two parts: the 
measurement model and the structural model.  The former is intended to link latent 
variables to observed indicators, whereas the latter specifies the causal relationships 
among the latent variables.  In the case of the informal economy, there is only one 
latent variable, i.e. its size. 
 
The first attempt to use a MIMIC model to estimate the size of the informal economy 
was by Frey and Weck-Hanneman (1984), who estimated the size of the ‘hidden’ 
economy in 17 OECD countries for the period 1960-1978. The authors did not define 
what they mean by a ‘hidden’ economy. 
 
Frey and Weck-Hanneman identified four determinates of informal activity:  
(i)  the burden of the state on economic agents (e.g. actual and perceived tax 
burden; share of public employees in total labour force); 
(ii)  tax morality; 
(iii)  the rate of unemployment; 
(iv)  the level of economic development.   
 
There are also three indicators: male participation rates, hours worked and real GDP 
growth. 
 
Using the MIMIC model, the authors find that there are three statistically significant 
determinants: share of direct taxation in GDP; share of public sector employees in 
total labour force, and tax immorality.  Of the three indicators, hours worked is the 
most important.   
 
The MIMIC model yields relative values which Frey and Weck-Hanneman use to 
rank the hidden economies of the 17 OECD countries.  These rankings are then 
converted into absolute values as a percentage of GNP for 1978.23  
 
The Frey and Weck-Hanneman approach has several shortcomings: 
 
(i)  There is no definition of the ‘hidden’ economy; 
                                                
23. For technical details of the calibration procedure, see Frey and Weck-Hanneman (1984) and Giles (1999a and 
1999b). 
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(ii)  Using the share of public employees in the total labour force as an indicator 
of the burden of regulation is questionable.  The number of regulations would 
seem a more obvious and direct measure; 
(iii)  Tax morality is a very complex issue which cannot simply be measured by an 
index.  Attitudes to tax are governed by historical, social and cultural factors. 
Even if the index was reliable, using an index constructed from US data (as 
the authors do) is certainly not representative of all countries; 
(iv)  The authors use the working assumption that weekly working hours in the 
metal industry is a representative and comparable indicator for the sample 
countries.  This is not convincing and requires explanation; 
(v)  The authors assert that Japan’s small hidden economy is due to a very low tax 
burden and regulation.  However, this ignores other possible explanations, 
such as the fact that the long working hours in Japan may preclude the 
opportunity to engage in hidden activities. 
 
Frey and Weck-Hanneman (1984) are aware of (ii) and (iii) when they state "An 
important shortcoming of our study is the weakness of the data at our disposition.  
This applies especially to tax morality and to regulation" (p. 47, my italics). 
 
Following in the footsteps of Frey and Weck-Hanneman, Giles (1999a) also uses the 
latent variable methodology. A MIMIC model is used to derive an index which is 
then combined with a currency demand equation in order to calibrate the size of the 
hidden economy in New Zealand. As with Frey and Weck-Hanneman, no definition 
of the term ‘hidden’ is given. 
 
Giles’s currency demand equation draws on Bhattacharyya (1990) but differs from it 
in two respects: (i) it allows for different velocities of circulation in the formal and 
informal sectors, rather than assuming these are the same; and (ii) it allows for the 
non-stationarity of the time-series data.  Giles’s approach estimates the New 
Zealand hidden economy to be between 6.8% and 11.3% during the period 1968-
1994. 
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Although the modelling procedure followed by Giles (1999a) emphasises diagnostic 
testing such as tests for cointegration, causality, functional form, etc., it completely 
lacks any theory24.   
 
4.6  Labour market measures 
Shifts from the formal to the informal labour market have been used as an indication 
of growth in the informal economy.  An example often quoted is Contini (1981), who 
examines the growth of the irregular labour market in Italy during the 1960s and 
1970s.  Irregular is defined as "all jobs outside the social security system" (ibid., p. 
403). However, Contini (1989) acknowledges that household production and non-
market activities as well as criminal activities also constitute the ‘hidden’ economy:  
"The underground (hidden) economy in its broadest sense includes all four 
activities" (ibid., p. 248). 
 
According to Contini (1981), the irregular labour market in Italy grew in size during 
the 1960s and 1970s due to three factors: 
 
(i)  The preference of workers for flexibility in their allocation of time as well as 
the avoidance of unemployment, even if it meant receiving lower rates of pay 
than in the regular labour market; 
(ii)  The increasing demand by small-scale enterprises for workers prepared to 
earn less than the official market rates; 
(iii)  Tax evasion by employers in the form of the non-payment of payroll taxes.  
More specifically, "payroll taxes and indirect charges add 50% - 70% to the 
basic pay.  This is […] a  powerful incentive for tax evasion on the side of the 
employers" (ibid., p. 240)25.  
 
Contini surveys some other Italian studies related to the informal labour market,  
citing for example studies showing that in the 1970s, over 5% of the labour force 
held two or more jobs.  Home-working was, and presumably still is, another 
                                                
24. An attempt to marry theory with empiricism is made by Loayza (1996), who applies a MIMIC model to 
estimate the size of the informal economy in Latin America.  Informal activity is defined by Loayza as “the 
set of economic units that do not comply with government taxes and regulations” (ibid., p.130).  Loayza’s 
MIMIC model is developed using endogenous growth theory and is based on the argument that informal 
economic activity arises when excessive taxes and regulations exist in conjunction with the inability to 
enforce compliance.  More recently, Chadhuri et al. (2006) have used a MIMIC model to estimate the size of 
the ‘shadow’ economy in the states of India.  The shadow economy is defined to include “income from legal 
and illegal activities that cannot be accounted for by the standard measurement procedures used in 
compilation of national income accounts” (ibid., p. 429).  An interesting feature of their approach is the 
inclusion of social and political variables such as per capita newspaper circulation and government 
ideology. 
25.  Contini also cites strict job protection legislation as a reason.    29
significant aspect of the Italian informal economy.  The number of home-workers 
engaged in the clothing and textile industry was estimated to be 500,000 in the early 
1970s, and in 1978 there were estimated to be around 1 million clandestine workers 
in the agricultural sector.  Contini’s own estimates of the size of the irregular labour 
force correspond to between 16% and 18% of the total labour force at the end of the 
1970s (see Contini, 1989). 
 
Using estimates of the informal economy (excluding criminal activities) based on 
labour market measures, Contini quotes studies indicating that the size of the 
informal economy in Italy during the mid to late-1970s was between 6% and 10% of 
GDP. 
 
Using the informal labour market as an indicator of the size of the informal economy 
has two drawbacks.  First, there is a problem of defining what constitutes formal 
and informal.  As the World Bank points out, there is a blurring between the two.  
"Some formal market jobs or enterprises can be classified as informal if it is found 
that they have poor work protection or if the life style and opportunities they entail 
are considered undesirable" (World Bank, 2007).  Second, due to the illegal nature of 
some activities and/or the illegal status of many workers in the informal labour 
market, the data cannot be considered as reliable. 
 
Before we begin to discuss the literature, we provide a brief summary of the specific 
criticisms of the various methodologies in Table 3. 
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Labour Market Measures 
 
 
        Criticisms 
 
•  Veracity of respondents cannot be trusted 
•  Sample may not be representative of the 
population 
•  Estimates are for a specific point in time 
 
•   Unrealistic assumptions are made (e.g. 
cash transactions only, a period in 
which informal activity did not exist, 
etc.) 
•   Econometric results are sensitive to 
choice of period 
 
•   Assumes FES data are unbiased 
•   Measures of income and expenditure are 
not statistically independent 
•   National income can be less than 
national expenditure 
•   Measurement error problems exist 
 
•   The ranking method is naive 
•   Unrepresentative proxy (electricity 
consumption approach) 
•   Identification problem (detection 
controlled estimation) 
 
•   Weakness of data 
•   Questionable assumptions 
•   Tax morality index problematic (Giles’s 
approach) 
 
•   Problem of definition 
•   Data unreliable due to clandestine 
nature of work & illegal status of 
employees 
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5.  General criticisms of the literature 
The definition of the informal economy (or any of the many other terms) remains 
problematic.  As we have seen in Section 4, some researchers avoid providing a 
definition, others provide a definition which includes criminal activities, whereas 
others exclude such activities.  Tanzi (1999) correctly points out that the unresolved 
question of a consensus definition "is not a minor or semantic issue but one of 
fundamental importance" (p. 339). 
 
As far as the estimates of the informal economy are concerned, we have seen how 
much variation is provided by the many studies we have reviewed.  The variation is 
not only between different studies but also within the same studies.  This is starkly 
illustrated by Table 4, which shows the large variation in estimates obtained using 
the money demand method.  
 
The five studies listed in the table are for the underground economy in Canada, and 
were undertaken by four authors, either jointly or separately.  The estimates vary 
from a low of 4.9% of GNP in 1976 obtained by authors A and B using Tanzi’s 
methodology, to 27.5% of GNP in the same year and by the same authors, but using 
Feige’s approach.  In their 1989 study the same authors used the Feige method to 
estimate the Canadian underground economy in 1982, yielding a range of 10.5%-
12.8% of GNP, which represents, in percentage terms, less than one-half of the 
equivalent 1976 estimate.  If we accept that both the 1976 and 1982 estimates are 
correct, it is difficult to believe that the underground economy in Canada has shrunk 
to less than half its former size in just six years. Thus, Table 4 illustrates why we 
should be sceptical about estimates of the informal economy26.    
 
A running theme in Section 4 was the lack of theory to support the empirical 
estimates.  This is the most serious shortcoming of the studies we have reviewed, 
and is a criticism forcefully made by Thomas (1999). 
 
In 1946 A. F. Burns and W. C. Mitchell published a book titled Measuring Business 
Cycles, which addresses the empirical study of cyclical fluctuations of economic 
variables.  In his seminal review article of the Burns and Mitchell book, Koopmans 
(1947) criticised the study for being too empiricist in the sense that "The various 
                                                
26. Our sceptism is reinforced by Tables A and B in the Appendix which show wide variations in estimates 
derived from different methodologies used over the past 30 years.  This has led Tanzi (1999) to state "These 
ranges do not give one great confidence in the estimations and leave one confused as to what to do with 
them" (p. 346).   32
choices as to what to ‘look for’, what economic phenomena to observe, and what 
measures to define and compute, are 
 
Table 4 -  Estimates of the ‘underground’ economy in Canada* 
  Author(s)  Date of 
 study 
Target 
  Year 




    A and B 
 
 
         A 
 
         C 
    A and B 
  D, A and B 
 
 


























Money demand (Gutmann) 
Money demand (Feige) 
Money demand (Tanzi) 
Money demand 
Money demand (Feige) 
Money demand (Tanzi) 
Money demand (Feige) 
Money demand (Feige) 
Money demand (Gutmann) 
Money demand (Tanzi) 
 
 
   15.7 
   27.5 
4.9 - 7.7 
    9.3 
   14.1 
     5.7 
10.5 – 12.8 
   19.3 
   21.6 
   14.6 
 
 
* This is an extensively adapted version of Table 3 in Smith (1997).  All the studies use 
the same definition of the underground economy which is: "market-based 
production of goods and services, whether legal or illegal, that escapes detection in 
the official estimates of GDP" (Smith, 1997, p. 15). 
 
made with a minimum of assistance from theoretical conception or hypotheses 
regarding the nature of the economic processes by which the variables studied are 
generated" (p. 161). And he continues: "The rejection of the help that economic 
theorizing might give leaves a void" (p. 164).  The overly empiricist approach not 
only leaves a void for the researcher but, just as importantly, for the policymaker.  
"Without resort to theory […] conclusions relevant to the guidance of economic 
policies cannot be drawn" (p. 167). Coming from one of the pioneers of economic 
empiricism, these are indeed strong critical comments.   
 
Drawing on Koopmans, Thomas (1999) levels a similar criticism against the existing 
black economy literature.  He argues that many of the empirical studies seek to 
obtain an aggregate number of the size of the informal economy without asking 
pertinent questions about the motivation and modus operandi of the agents involved.   33
This "has led economists into a blind alley in which the question of size has become 
an end in itself […]  No genuine policy conclusions emerge from the exercise, 
although some have been tacked on, varying according to the political persuasion of 
the author concerned" (ibid., p. 387).  
 
6.  Conclusions 
After 50 years of research on the size of the informal economy, what have we learnt?  
First, as the plethora of adjectives to describe informal activities indicates, there 
remains no consensus on an appropriate term and, more importantly, on what is to 
be measured.  Second, this lack of consensus is also to be found in the large number 
of methodologies and estimates.  This has obvious policy implications.  The policies 
associated with an informal economy accounting for only 2% of GDP are clearly not 
the same as those that would be required if it represented 30% of GDP.  Frey (1989) 
recognises the difficulty of identifying what constitutes a problematic size of 
informal economy when he states "nobody can a priori say which size of the 
unobserved economy is socially optimal" (p.126). 
 
Rather than concentrating on obtaining an aggregate number which cannot be relied 
upon with confidence, we instead argue that economists need to collaborate with 
specialists from other disciplines such as criminologists and sociologists in order to 
understand the functioning of the grey economy, especially the linkages between the 
many forms of legal and illegal activities. Consideration also needs to be given to a 
number of factors often ignored or insufficiently analysed as determinants of 
participation in informal activities.  While much coverage has been given to factors 
such as the tax burden, onerous government regulations and the availability (or 
otherwise) of public goods, relatively little has been written about the role of 
poverty, cultural attitudes towards the state, the legal status of immigrant workers, 
the role of professionals (lawyers, accountants, etc.) in criminal activities, and social 
and political attitudes towards different forms of crime. Such a multidisciplinary 
approach is more likely to yield fruitful results for politicians who need to design 
appropriate policies rather than estimating an aggregate number which, ultimately, 
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Appendix 
 
Table A.  Selection of estimates of the informal economy 
(by chronological order of study) 
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1. The figures for Tanzi (1983) and Bhattacharrya (1990) have been rounded to one decimal figure. 
2. Using weighted average tax rate.  The lower figure is for 1930 and the higher figure for 1980. 
3. Using average tax rate.  The lower figure is for 1932 and the higher figure for 1980. 
4. Average for 17 countries.  Highest figure is 13.2% for Sweden and lowest figure is 4.1% for Japan. 
5. The study was originally published in Italian in 1979 and the result is reported in Contini (1989). 
6. Average for 14 countries.  Lowest figure is 18.2% for Chile and highest is 65.6% for Bolivia. 
7. Average for 11 countries.  Lowest figure is 6.5% for Uzbekistan in 1995 and highest is 63.5% for 
Georgia in 1994. 
8. Average for 6 countries.  Lowest figure is 5.8% for Slovakia in 1995 and highest is 30.6% for Hungary 
in 1992. 
9. Average for 14 countries.  Highest figure is 48.3% for Thailand and lowest figure is 10.6% for Japan.  I 
have  excluded the figure for China since Chaudhuri et al (2006) state that this is not reliable.  35
 
                                                                                          Appendix (cont.) 
 
Table B.  Selection of estimates of the informal economy 
(by country/region) 

















































0.6% - 6.1%2  (GNP) 
1.7% - 4.5%3 (GNP) 
 














































































































































1.   The figures for Tanzi (1983) and Bhattacharrya (1990) have been rounded to one decimal figure. 
2.    Using weighted average tax rate.  The lower figure is for 1930 and the higher figure for 1980. 
3.    Using average tax rate.  The lower figure is for 1932 and the higher figure for 1980. 
4.    The study was originally published in Italian in 1979 and the result is reported in Contini (1989). 
5.    Average for 17 countries.  Highest figure is 13.2% for Sweden and lowest figure is 4.1% for Japan. 
6.   Average for 11 countries.  Lowest figure is 6.5% for Uzbekistan in 1995 and highest is 63.5% for 
Georgia in 1994. 
7.   Average for 6 countries.  Lowest figure is 5.8% for Slovakia in 1995 and highest is 30.6% for 
Hungary in 1992. 
8.    Average for 14 countries.  Lowest figure is 18.2% for Chile and highest is 65.6% for Bolivia. 
9.   Average for 14 countries.  Highest figure is 48.3% for Thailand and lowest figure is 10.6% for Japan.  
I have excluded the figure for China since Chaudhuri et al (2006) state that this is not reliable.   36
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